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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze the problem of power
control in a multiuser MIMO network, where the optimal linear
precoder is employed in each user to achieve maximum point-
to-point information rate. We design a distributed power control
algorithm based on the concept of game theory and contractive
functions that has a couple of advantages over the previous
designs (e.g. more uniqueness probability of Nash equilibria and
asynchronous implementation). Despite these improvements, the
sum-rate of the users does not increase because the proposed
algorithm can not lead the power control game to an efficient
equilibrium point. We solve this issue by modifying our algorithm
such that the game is led to the equilibrium that satisfies
a particular criterion. This criterion can be chosen by the
designer to achieve a certain optimality among the equilibria.
Furthermore, we propose the inexact method that helps us to
boost the convergence speed of our modified algorithms. Lastly,
we show that pricing algorithms can also be a special case of our
modified algorithms. Simulations show a noticeable improvement
in the sum-rate when we modify our proposed algorithm.
Keywords—power control, interference channel, game theory,
iterative water-filling, convergence speed
I. INTRODUCTION
IN many wireless networks, such as ad-hoc networks orcognitive radio networks, there are multiple independent
users that share a common communication environment. The
interference channel is the most relevant mathematical model
used to analyze the interaction of users in such networks.
In order to calculate an inner bound for the capacity of the
interference channel, the simplifying and pragmatic assump-
tions such as neglecting the use of interference cancellation
techniques are common in the analysis of interference channels
[1]. As these assumptions suggest, the analysis of the capacity
of the interference channel simplifies to the analysis of power
consumption of the users in network. Motivated by this fact,
there are several studies about the power allocation of the users
in an interference channel (see [2], [3], [4] and references
therein). In [3], Yates et al. introduced the concept of standard
functions that permits a general proof of the synchronous and
totally asynchronous convergence of the iterative power control
to a unique fixed point, minimizing the total transmit power for
each user. Long after the work of Yates, Feyzmahdavian et al.
in [5] introduced a slight and clever variation of the standard
functions, namely as contractive functions to introduce a more
unified explanation of distributed power control frameworks.
Moreover, the concept of contractive interference functions
was extended by the original authors to several cases of
distributed power control.
The “performance coupling”among the users is the main
challenge of using distributed approaches because the increase
of one user’s performance comes at the price of performance
degradation of others. One of the most applicable tools in
distributed optimization is the use of game theoretical con-
cepts. Motivated by this fact, we are interested in modeling
the distributed power control in an interference channel as
a non-cooperative game, where every user is a player that
competes against the others by choosing the power allocation
that maximizes its own information rate. A Nash equilibrium
is achieved when no player can unilaterally increase its own
information rate given the current strategies of the others [6].
Analysis of power control in interference channel using non-
cooperative game theory was first done in [4], where Yu, et
al. solved the power control problem in Digital Subscriber
Line (DSL) systems by modeling the system as a gaussian
frequency-selective interference channel and performing Iter-
ative Water-Filling Algorithm (IWFA). Since then, a number
of studies have been done to extend this original idea, and
finally, the studies of Scutari et al. brought a unified view of
distributed IWFA in many scenarios such as multiuser MIMO
and cognitive radio systems (see [7], [8]).
In this paper, distributed power control in multiuser MIMO
systems, is investigated with the help of game theory and
contractive interference functions. Our approach is compared
with the state-of-the-art method used in [8], where the authors
give a different interpretation of water-filling by using it as a
contraction mapping. We show that with the use of the same
amount of signaling as in the previous papers, the uniqueness
of Nash equilibria is more probable in our approach. Further-
more, we show that our distributed power control algorithm
is flexible enough to deal with various practical limitations of
communications networks such as communication delays.
Although our algorithm has a number of advantages
over the previous studies, the sum-rate maximization is not
achieved. This is because of the fact that the equilibrium points
achieved with non-cooperative games may not be Pareto opti-
mal points. This issue may steer the interest away from using
our algorithm in practice. Therefore, the issue of performance
coupling among the users must be taken into account. To
overcome this issue, we seek for a different definition of non-
cooperative power control games using the concepts of varia-
tional inequality. With this definition, we modify our proposed
algorithm such that the equilibrium point achieved in the power
control game is the one that satisfies a certain criterion for us.
The optimality criterion can be chosen arbitrarily in order to
achieve different optimality conditions. When we choose sum-
rate maximization as our criterion, the power control game
achieves more efficient equilibrium points in terms of sum-
rate. We also propose an inexact method to reduce the number
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of iteration for our modified algorithms, which makes our
algorithms more suitable for practical implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
the general system model is described. In section III, the power
control problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and
the elements of the game are determined. In section IV, a brief
introduction of contraction mappings and contractive functions
is presented. After that, the analysis of uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium is done, and the condition that guarantees the
uniqueness of NE in power control game is established. Next,
we discuss the design of distributed power control algorithms
in section V. In section VI, we show the strength and the
weakness of our algorithm, then we define the concept of
variational inequality to make foundations for our further
analysis of the power control game, In section VII, we try
to find a solution to eliminate the weakness of our algorithm
by designing new modified versions of it. In Section VIII,
the computer simulations verify our theoretical analysis in the
previous section, and it is shown that we were able to overcome
the weakness of our algorithm. Finally, section IX concludes
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we employ a multiuser MIMO channel as
our system model. There are Q transmit-receive pairs, and
each pair is a user. The qth transmitter has NTq transmit
antennas and the qth receiver has NRq receive antennas. The
received signal at each receiver interfered by the other Q− 1
transmitters. As we do not allow any multiuser encoding or
coordination among the users, the interference at each receiver
is treated as an additive component. Hence, the received signal
at the qth receiver (i.e, yq) is
yq = Hqqxq +
∑
r 6=q
Hrqxr + nq, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., Q} (1)
where xq ∈ CNTq is the complex transmitted signal from
the qth transmitter, yq ∈ CNRq , Hrq ∈ CNRq×NTr is the
complex channel matrix between the rth transmitter and qth
receiver, and nq is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
vector with the covariance matrix Rnq = N0qINRq×NRq where
the scalar value N0q is the power of the noise and I is the
identity matrix. Hence, the vector
∑
r 6=qHrqxr is the multiuser
interference (MUI) at the qth receiver. Given E {xqxHq } as the
covariance matrix of the vector xq , the power constraint for
each transmitter is
E {||xq||2} = Tr
(E {xqxHq }) ≤ Pq, (2)
where ||.||2 is the second vector norm, Tr(.) is the trace
operator, and Pq is a scalar value that represents the total
amount of power that a transmitter can distribute between its
antennas. Assuming that the vector pq = [p1q, ..., p
NTq
q ]T =
diag
(E {xqxHq }) indicates the power of the transmitted signal
from the qth transmitter, the power constraint for the qth user
can alternatively be shown as:
NTq∑
i=1
piq ≤ Pq. (3)
q q Q Q Q Q 
Fig. 1: System Model
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Using Channel State Information (CSI): We assume that
each transmitter knows the channel between itself and its
receiver pair 1. It can be shown that the knowledge of CSI
(in i.i.d channels) at the transmitter can significantly improve
the capacity of channel [9]. The knowledge of CSI can be ex-
ploited by designing an appropriate precoder, and the capacity-
achieving scheme is to use singular-value decomposition to
diagonalize the channel between a transmit-receive pair. The
singular-value decomposition of Hqq yields
Hqq = UqΣqV
H
q , (4)
where Uq and Vq are unitary matrices and Σq is the di-
agonal matrix of singular values of Hqq . We assume the
vector diag(Σq) = σq = [σ1q , ..., σ
νq
q ]T (where νq =
min(NTq , NRq )) is the vector of the singular values of Hqq.
Using Vq as the precoder matrix and UHq as the decoding
matrix, the received signal at the qth receiver would be
y˜q = Σqxq +
∑
r 6=q
UHq HrqVrxr + U
H
q nq, (5)
where y˜q = UHq yq . Since U and V are invertible, knowing
y˜q is the same as knowing yq . Furthermore, the noise vector’s
statistics do not change when multiplied by UHq , since Uq is
a unitary matrix and nq has independent Gaussian elements
[10, Chapter 3]. We take H˜rq = UHq HrqVr as an NRq ×NTr
matrix. The element in the ith row and jth column of H˜rq
is shown by the operator
[
H˜rq
]
i,j
. Assuming no correlation
between the transmit and receive antennas, the capacity of the
MIMO channel between the qth transmit-receive pair would
be:
Rq =
νq∑
i=1
log
(
1 +
piq
ciq
)
, (6)
1This assumption imposes no overhead more than the previous related work
(compare with [8]).
where ciq –the normalized interference plus noise of the qth
user– is written as
ciq =
∑
r 6=q

NT r∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜rq]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2 pjr
|σiq|2
+
N0q
|σiq|2
, i ∈ {1, ..., νq}.
(7)
Game Formulation: We assume that each user myopically
chooses the best strategy for itself, so we formulate this
scenario as a non-cooperative game, in which the best strategy
of each user is
max
pq
Rq (8)
s.t.
NTq∑
i=1
piq ≤ Pq.
Therefore, in this game, the utility function of each player (or
user) is its point-to-potint information rate and the strategy of
each player is choosing the best power allocation according to
its power constraint (i.e., strategy set) to maximize its rate. The
maximum information rate is achieved by performing water-
filling which can be shown as
piq
∗
=
(
µq − ciq
)+
, (9)
where (...)+ = max(... , 0) and µq is a positive value that
satisfies the power constraint.
The existence of Nash equilibrium in this game can be
proven by showing that the strategy set of each user is
non-empty, compact and convex subset of some Euclidean
real space RNTq , and the utility function of each user is
a continuous and quasi-concave function of its own power
vector. The detailed proof for the existence of NE is straight-
forward and skipped for brevity. The uniqueness of equilibrium
is investigated in the next section.
IV. UNIQUENESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
So far, we have formulated a non-cooperative power control
game in a multi-user MIMO system, in which every transmitter
performs water-filling in allocating the power between its
antennas. In this section, we introduce a new characterization
of MIMO power control. First, we review fundamentals of
fixed-point theory as the basis of our analyses.
Fixed-Point Theory: Consider the following iteration:
x(k + 1) = T (x(k)) , k = 1, 2, ..., (10)
where T is a mapping from a subset X of RK to itself, and
k indicates the index of iterations. If T is continuous and
||T (x)− T (y)|| ≤ c||x− y|| , ∀x, y ∈ X (11)
where ||.|| is some norm in X and c ∈ [0, 1), then the
mapping T is a contraction mapping with c as the contraction
modulus, and sequence {x(n)} generated by the iterations in
(10) converges to the fixed point x∗ [11, Chapter 13].
Contractive Functions: A function I : RK+ → RK+ (where
RK+ = {p|p > 0, p ∈ R}) is said to be contractive if it, for all
p ≥ 0 satisfies [5]:
• Positivity: I(p) ≥ 0
• Monotonicity: if p ≥ p′, then I(p) ≥ I(p′)
• Contractivity: There exists a constant c ∈ [0, 1) –
namely as the contractivity modulus– and a vector
v > 0 such that I(p+ αv) ≤ I(p) + cαv, ∀α > 0.
The following results have been deriven about contractive
functions [5]:
Proposition 1. If a function I : RK+ → RK+ is contractive
with c ∈ [0, 1) as the contractivity modulus, then
1) It is a contraction mapping with maximum norm and
c ∈ [0, 1) as the contraction modulus, then it has a
unique fixed point p∗, and the same iteration as in
(10) for I(p) will converge to p∗.
2) The following function is also contractive with the
same modulus c ∈ [0, 1):
Iq(p) = max {pmin,min{pmax, I(p)}} , (12)
where pmin and pmax can be the minumum and
miaximum constraints on the power allocation, re-
spectively.

With these results, we are now ready to present a new
theorem on the convergence of distributed power control in
our scenario.
Theorem 1. The MIMO power control game defined in the
previous section with the players’ strategies written as (9) has
a unique Nash equilibrium if ∀(i, q) we have
max
(i,q)
∑
r 6=q
NTr∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜rq]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2
|σiq|2
< 1, (13)
or alternatively
max
(i,q)
∑
r 6=q
NTr∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜qr]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2
|σiq|2
< 1. (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
V. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In the previous section, it was proved that the distributed
iterative waterfilling that each user performs is a conrtactive
function (, and therefore a contraction mapping with maximum
norm). The immediate result of this proof is that the iterative
water-filling algorithm can be done totally asynchronously in
the sense of [11]. Let Tq, ∀q ∈ {1, 2, ..., q} be the set of
times (or iteration numbers) when qth user updates its power
allocation. While updating the power allocation, it is possible
that an outdated power radiated by the interfering links is
used by a user in the calculation total interference, so the
power allocation may not be according to the recent changes in
the network. This usually happens due to the communication
delays that may occur in the network. To model this issue in
the network, we assume that θq
(n)
= {θq(n)1 , ..., θq
(n)
Q } as the
set of most recent times that the information from each user
is received by the qth user at the nth iteration. Therefore, at
each iteration n ∈ Tq the qth transmitter performs waterfilling
based on the θq
(n)
that is available at the nth iteration. With
these definitions, we are ready to present our asynchronous
power control algorithm for the iteration number n which is
as follows:
Algorithm V.1 Asynchronous Iterative Water-filling
Set pq(0) such that
∑NTq
i=1 p
i
q ≤ Pq
1: for n=1 to itmax do
2: repeat ∀(i, q) ∈ {1, ..., νq} × {1, ..., Q}
3: piq
(n)
=

(
µq
(n−1) − ciq(n−1)
)+
if n ∈ Tq
piq
(n−1) otherwise
,
4: until Convergence
5: end for
In the above algorithm, itmax denotes the maximum num-
ber of iterations, and the fourth step can be replaced with
a particular termination criterion. Furthermore, in the term
ciq
(n), the most recent power updates of other users (according
to θq
(n)
) are available. The special cases of asynchronous
implementation include synchronous implementation (Jacobi
algorithm [11]) and sequential implementation (Gauss-Seidel
algorithm [11]), that are used in the previous algorithms [4],
[7]. For the Jacobi Algorithm we have
Tq = {1, 2, ..., itmax}, θq(n) = {n, ..., n} (15)
which means at each iteration all of the users simultaneously
update their power allocation, and for Gauss-Seidel we have
Tq = {q, q +Q, q + 2Q, ..., q +
(
itmax
Q
− 1
)
Q}
θq
(n)
=
{ {n− (q − 1), ..., n− 1} forj = 1 : q − 1
{n, n− (Q− 1), ..., n− q} forj = q : Q
(16)
which means at each iteration only one user updates its power
allocation and all the other users do not update, and this
procedure sequentially continues between the users. It should
be noted that due to its sequential nature, the Gauss-Seidel
algorithm may require a proper scheduler in the network.
Depending on the limitations of the network in terms of com-
munication delay, one can use different update patterns, which
shows the flexibility of asynchronous power control algorithm
in practical situations2. In sum, as long as the transmitters
are intended to update their power allocations (i.e., the set Tq
has infinite elements [11, Chapter 6]) and all the transmitters
eventually become aware of other transmitters’ interference
(i.e., limn→∞ θq(n) =∞ [11, Chapter 6]), our power control
algorithm converges under any update pattern. This result is
2In the simulation part, we only use synchornous power control (i.e. Jacobi
method in the sense of [11]) as it converges quite fast.
valuable as it is applicable to other approaches that only
prove the convergence of power control under Gauss-Seidel
algorithm and the convergence of Jacobi algorithm is proved
by conducting simulations with no theoretical analysis (see
[12]). Moreover, the convergence under asynchronous iteration
mitigates the need for scheduler (which is the disadvantage of
Gauss-Seidel algorithm) and accurate synchronization (which
is the disadvantage of Jacobi algorithm).
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND MODIFICATION
In this section, we evaluate the analyses done in the
previous sections and compare them to the other reference’s
work. These comparisons reveal the strength and the weakness
of our algorithm.
A. Performance Analysis
We simulated a network comprised of four MIMO links
that share the same band. The wireless channel is comprised
of an i.i.d complex Gaussian flat-fading with zero mean and
unit variance for the small-scale fading, and exponential path-
loss for the large-scale fading. The additive noise is set to
i.i.d complex Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. We
assume that a given scenario NT ×NR indicates NT transmit
antennas and NR receive antennas for all of the users, meaning
that NTq = NT & NRq = NR, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., Q}). All of
the users have the same total power budget Pq = 10dB, ∀q.
The distance between the qth transmit-receive pair is shown as
dqq and the distance between the rth transmitter and the qth
receiver drq. Lastly, the path-loss exponent is set to γ = 2.5.
In this simulation, we want to quantify how adequately our
derived conditions in (13) and (14) can predict the convergence
of the power control game in practice. Fig. 2 shows the
probability of uniqueness of NE as a function of drq, where
dqq = 15. Each point on the curves, is the result of the total
number of times that a particular criterion is satisfied (and the
game also converges to the unique NE) divided by the total
number of channel realizations. There are 1000 total channel
realizations for each point of the curves. Each realization is
done within the maximum of 100 iterations of Jacobi method.
The termination criterion is that if the normalized difference
between the two consecutive iterations becomes smaller than
10−4 the algorithm ends. Three criteria are used for each an-
tenna configuration. The curves with the stars indicate whether
the condition in [8, Condition 7] is satisfied. The curves with
circles indicate the probability of uniqueness according to the
satisfaction of (13) or (14). Finally the solid curves indicate
the convergence to the unique NE if ρ(M) < 1 is satisfied.
First of all, both of the convergence criteria we derived predict
the uniqueness of NE more than the condition derived in
[8] for small distances because the precoding employed in
our approach uses the channel information more efficiently.
Furthermore, the condition ρ(M) < 1 predicts the uniqueness
more than the condition in (13). As it was said, the conditions
in (13) and (14) are derived by setting the weighting vector
v = 1 in ||M ||v∞. By setting v = 1, the probability of
uniqueness of NE becomes less than the reference curve as
the interfering distances increase3. In fact, when the condition
3Note that the conditions derived in [8] are not practical as well. The
practical conditions derived in [8] have worse performance loss.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of probability of uniqueness of NE for different
number of transmit/receive antennas w.r.t. interfering distance
ρ(M) < 1 is satisfied, the vector v can have any value,
but setting v = 1 leads to more conservative conditions that
ignores some situations wherein the vector v has a value other
than v = 1. However, setting v = 1 leads to more practical
conditions that are suitable for network designing. Lastly, for
the case NT = 4 & NR = 2 (which is shown as 4× 2 in Fig.
2), our criteria have the same trend as the criterion in [8] does,
making our proof for the case NT > NR reasonable.
B. Alternative Definition of the Power Control Game
Although there are some improvements in our proposed
algorithm, the sum-rate of the users has not been improved
yet, which makes our algorithm (and most of non-cooperative
power control games) less favorable for practical implemen-
tations. This is due to the fact that the Nash equilibria of
the game is in general not Pareto optimal, then the selfish
maximization of rate cannot be guaranteed to achieve global
optimality. In order to modify our algorithm, we need another
definition of power control game. This definition is based
on the concept of variational inequality. In the following, we
define this concept and its application in non-cooperative game
theory.
Definition 1. Let F : Q → Rn be a real-valued vector
function, where Q is a nonempty, closed, and convex set. The
variational inequality V I(Q, F ) is the problem of finding a
vector x∗ such that the following inequality is satisfied:
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (17)
This problem is a generalization of minimum principle in
convex optimization. For a convex function f(x), the point x∗
is the minimum of f if the following inequality is satisfied:
(x− x∗)T∇f(x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (18)
The relation between variational inequality and game theory
is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Consider Q players in a non-cooperative game
with convex utility functions fq(x) ∀q, where x is a vector
comprised of other vectors (i.e., x = [x1, x2, ..., xQ]T ). Assum-
ing closed and convex solution sets for fq(x) ∀q, the vector
x∗ is the Nash equilibrium of the game if for the function
F (x) = [∇x1f1(x),∇x2f2(x), ...,∇xQfQ(x)]Twe have [13]:
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Q. (19)
Next, we state an important property in variational inequal-
ity, which will be used later in this paper.
Theorem 3. For a mapping F : Q → Rn, that is continuously
differentiable on Q, and has the Jacobian matrix denoted by
J , it hold that ∀x ∈ Q [13]:
• F (x) is monotone on Q iff J (x) is positive semidefi-
nite. Therefore, the problem V I(Q, F ) has a (possibly
empty) convex solution set.
• F (x) is strictly monotone on Q if J (x) is positive
definite. Therefore, the problem V I(Q, F ) has at most
one solution.
• F (x) is strongly monotone on Q iff (J − csmI) is
positive semidefinite (csm is the strong monotonicity
modulus). Therefore, the problem V I(Q, F ) has a
unique solution.
In the following, we try to write the power control game
as a variational inequality problem. To do so, we address an
important property of KKT conditions.
Proposition 2. Consider the optimization problem (8). Replac-
ing the negative of the objective function, we have the following
KKT conditions:
0 ≤ piq ⊥ −
1(
ciq + p
i
q
) − λiq ≥ 0, (20)
0 ≤ λiq ⊥
νq∑
i=1
piq − Pq = 0.
With the additional constraints4 piq ≤ P iq and Pq <
∑
i P
i
q ,
the KKT conditions are equivalent to [14]:
0 ≤ piq ⊥
(
ciq + p
i
q
)− λiq − uiq ≥ 0, (21)
0 ≤ λiq ⊥
νq∑
i=1
piq − Pq = 0,
0 ≤ uiq ⊥ piq − P iq ≤ 0.
Therefore, the optimization problem (8) can be written as
min
pq
1
2
νq∑
i=1
|| (ciq + piq) ||2 (22)
s.t.
νq∑
i=1
piq < Pq.
It is worth mentioning that the term − 1
(ciq+piq)
in the
first line of (20) is actually −∇pqRq . Therefore, setting
4These constraints impose a limit on the maximum power that each antenna
can transmit, which are reasonable in practice
F (p) = [−∇p1R1, ...,−∇pQRQ]T the problem V I(Q, F ) can
be demonstrated. Using the above proposition, we can set
F (p) = M ′p, where M ′ is the same as matrix M in (38)
except that diag(M ′) = [1, 1, ..., 1]T . It should be noted that
in problem V I(Q, F ), whenever the function F (x) is an affine
function, there is no difference between strictly monotonicity
and strongly monotonicity [13]. Using theorem 3 we deduce
that:
Corollary 1. The problem V I(Q, F ), with F (p) = M ′p, has
a unique solution, if the same uniqueness conditions derived
in theorem 1 can be satisfied.
Proof: Let D(di, [M ′]ii) be the closed disc centered at
[M ′]ii with radius di =
∑
j 6=i |[M ′]ij |. Using the Gershgorin
circle theorem, ∀i ≤ max
{
(
∑Q
q=1 νq), (
∑Q
q=1NTq )
}
, every
eigenvalue of M ′ is within at least one of the aforementioned
circles. We also know that for the function F , in order to be
strictly (or strongly) monotone, the matrix M ′ has to positive
definite. Hence, all the radii of the Gershgorin circles must be
less than one to ensure that the matrix M ′ remains positive
definite. Using this fact (for M ′ and M ′T ), the conditions
written in (13) and (14) can be easily derived.
Remark: From the variational inequality point of view, we
can again show that the conditions in (13) and (14) are not tight
enough to predict the uniqueness of NE. This can be shown
by the fact that if the radii of Gershgorin circles become larger
than one, the probability of having positive eigenvalues (i.e.,
positive definiteness of M ′) still exists. However, the derived
conditions in (13) and (14) skip this probability in order to
introduce more practical conditions.
The power control game introduced as a variational in-
equality, can help us design modified algorithms that improve
the performance of the network. The next section deals with
designing such modified algorithms.
VII. MODIFYING ALGORITHMS
After introducing the alternative definition of power control
game, we present our modified algorithms in this section in
order to overcome the issues related to our power control
method.
A. Regularization: Guaranteeing Convergence
The physical interpretation of the previous uniqueness
conditions implies that sum of normalized received (generated)
interference at (by) each receive (transmit) antenna must be
lower than one. In the cases where such condition is not
satisfied, there will be more than one NE, and the proposed
algorithm is not guaranteed to converge. In order to overcome
this issue, we add the term τ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣piq(n) − piq(n−1)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 to the
objective function of (22), while we are at the nth iteration of
finding the NE (τ > 0). By adding this term, and after writing
KKT conditions again, we have the problem V I(Q, Fτ ), where
Fτ (p) = (M
′+τI)p+b, and b = −τp(n−1). In fact, by adding
the (large enough) constant τ to the diagonal elements of the
matrix M ′, we move the centers of Gershgorin circles farther
from the origin (to larger positive values) so that the radii of
the circles can be larger than one, and the positive definiteness
of the Jacobian matrix of Fτ , namely Jτ , can be guaranteed
more than before. After the modification of objective function,
the waterfilling solution changes to
piq
∗
=
(
µq
τ + 1
− c
i
q
τ + 1
+
τ
τ + 1
piq
(n−1)
)+
. (23)
Therefore, the third step of algorithm V.1 should be modified
accordingly. The free parameter τ must satisfy
τ > max
(i,q)
∑
r 6=q
NTr∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜rq]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2
|σiq|2
− 1, (24)
This constraint ensures the uniqueness of NE along with the
convergence of the asynchronous algorithm, and can be easily
calculated by finding the limit (or the distance) below which
the matrix M ′ + τI is positive definite. Depending on how
much coordination exists between the users, the constant τ
can be estimated5. It should be noted that choosing τ to be too
much large can reduce the effect of interference in adjusting the
power allocation and increases the effect of previous iterations
in power allocation, which is not of our interest. It is important
to know that that whether the solution found for V I(Q, Fτ )
is in the solution set of V I(Q, F ). If a vector p∗ is a solution
for V I(Q, Fτ ), for all p ∈ Q we have
(p− p∗)TFτ (p∗) ≥ 0. (25)
Because we ensured that by a proper choice of τ , the conver-
gence to the solution of V I(Q, Fτ ) is guaranteed, which means
piq
(n) ' piq(n−1) when n → ∞. Hence, at the convergence
point, for all p ∈ Q we have:
(p− p∗)T (F (p∗) + τ(p∗ − p∗)) ≥ 0,
⇒ (p− p∗)TF (p∗) ≥ 0. (26)
Therefore, the solution found for V I(Q, Fτ ) is also a solution
for V I(Q, F ).
B. Controlling the Convergence to the NE
Despite guaranteeing the convergence of the power control
game in the previous method, there is still no control on which
NE the game converges to. In other words, there is still no
guarantee on the efficiency of the achieved NE. The solution
to this problem is that we have to choose the most efficient
NE in our power control game. Meaning that the chosen NE
should optimize a particular criterion. Considering the solution
set of V I(Q, F ) as SOL(Q, F ), we want to reach to the NE
point that optimizes a convex function φ(p). To do so, we have
the following optimization:
min
p
φ(p)
subject to p ∈ SOL(Q, F ). (27)
As there is no prior access to the SOL(Q, F ) (i.e., no access
to all of the equilibrium points), this optimization cannot be
done using bi-level optimization algorithms. We propose to
solve the problem V I(Q, F,τ ), where:
F,τ (p) = F (p) + 
(n)∇φ(p) + τ(p− p(n−1)), (28)
5Adaptive estimation of τ can be a potential subject of future work.
and ∇φ(p) = [∇p1φ(p), ...,∇pQφ(p)]T is the gradient vector
of the function φ(p) with respect to the vector p, (n) is a
positive variable that is a function of iteration number, and the
term τ(p−p(n−1)) is in fact the same modification done in the
previous subsection. It is clear that if the game reaches to the
NE that minimizes φ(p), the second term of (28) has zero (or
the smallest) value. The most important contribution of (28)
is summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 4. Consider the monotone problem V I(Q, F ) (i.e.,
F (p) is monotone in this problem) with the solution set
SOL(Q, F ). For n → ∞, the solution of the problem
V I(Q, F,τ ) converges to the minimum point of φ(p), if the
following assumptions hold:
1) The solution set SOL(Q, F ) is closed and convex.
2) φ(p) is Lipschitz continuous on SOL(Q, F ) with the
modulus Lφ.
3) the constant τ satisfies the following constraint
τ > max
(i,q)
∑
r 6=q
NTr∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜rq]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2
|σiq|2
+ (n)Lφ − 1 (29)
4) The constant (n) is chosen such that limn→∞(n) =
0, and
∑∞
n=1 
(n) =∞.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Considering the above theorem, we can design a framework
in which the users can optimize a certain merit function, while
non-cooperatively competing with each other. The following
algorithm describes how this framework can be implemented:
Algorithm VII.1
Choose suitable (n) and τ and any p(0) ∈ Q
1: for n=1 to outeritmax do
2: repeat
3: p(n) = Solve V I(Q, F,τ ) //Use Jacobian
4: until Convergence
5: end for
It is clear that this algorithm is comprised of two loops of
iterations. The third line is the inner loop of iterations, in which
users non-cooperatively optimize their objective functions. In
other words, the third line is the same as the non-cooperative
game implemented in algorithm V.1 with the difference that
the waterfilling solution changes to
piq
∗
=
1
τ + 1
(
µq − ciq + τpiq
(n−1) − (n)∇ipqφ(p(n))
)+
.
(30)
Therefore, the third step of algorithm V.1 should be modified
accordingly. Using the third assumption in theorem 4, in each
iteration of the above algorithm, we can use Jacobian method
for the third line6.
6Note that due to the practical limitations imposed on the network, the
asynchronous algorithm introduced in the previous section can be used.
C. Inexact Convergence
Although the theory behind previous modifications might
seem to increase the performance of non-cooperative power
control games, running the algorithm VII.1 requires a lot of
iterations which makes this algorithm too slow to be imple-
mented. In this part of paper, we propose a solution in which
we calculate an inexact solution of the V I(Q, F,τ ), allowing
us to run algorithm with a lower number of iterations. The
following property has an important contribution in deducing
the inexact convergence.
Proposition 3. Consider the monotone problem V I(Q, Fτ ),
that has solution set SOL(Q, Fτ ). Given the inexact solution
set SOLδn(Q, Fτ ) in the nth iteration as
SOLδn(Q, Fτ ) =
{
p
(n)
δ ∈ Q
∣∣∣Fτ (p(n)δ )T (y − p(n)δ ) ≥ −δn}
∀y ∈ Q,
(31)
and assuming limn→∞ δnτ = 0 and
∑∞
n=0
δn
τ <∞, we have:
lim
n→∞ ||p
(n)
δ − p(n−1)δ || = 0. (32)
Proof: See Appendix C.
As the choice of F (or Fτ ) in the above proprty was
arbitrary, we can draw the same conclusion for F(p) =
F (p) + (n)∇φ(p) (or F,τ ) as well if the term ∇φ(p) is
also monotone7. The result of proposition 3 makes us ready
to present the main theorem regarding inexact convergence of
power control game.
Theorem 5. Consider the monotone problem V I(Q, F,τ ),
that has solution set SOL(Q, F,τ ). Given the inexact solution
set SOLδn(Q, F,τ ) in the nth iteration as:
SOLδn(Q, F,τ ) =
{
p
(n)
δ ∈ Q
∣∣∣F,τ (p(n)δ )T (y − p(n)δ ) ≥ −δn}
∀y ∈ Q,
(33)
and assuming limn→∞ δnτ = 0 and
∑∞
n=0
δn
τ < ∞, for
n→∞, the sequence of the solutions p(n)δ ∈ SOLδn(Q, F,τ )
converge to the minimum point of φ(p)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The result of the analyses done in this subsection, provides
us with the following algorithm:
7In the next subsection, the choices for the merit function satisfies mono-
tonicity. The proofs for the monotinicity of the functions used in simulation
part are skipped for brevity.
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Algorithm VII.2 Inexact Power Control Algorithm
Choose suitable (n) and τ and any p(0) ∈ Q
1: for n=1 to outeritmax do
2: repeat
3: Find p(n)δ ∈ SOLδn(Q, F,τ ), that satisfies
F,τ (p
(n)
δ )
T (y − p(n)δ ) ≥ −δn, ∀y ∈ Q
4: //Use Jacobian
5: until Convergence
6: end for
D. On the Choice of Merit Function
Choosing the merit function is the important part of the
modification, as it determines the amount of signaling, compu-
tation, and performance improvement. We mention two options
for a possible merit function. These two merit functions have
different performance from one another and impose different
signaling requirement.
1) Minimizing Multiuser Interference: The sum of the
multiuser interference is the sum of the rows of the interference
function I(p) = M.p (see Appendix A.). Therefore, by using
the merit function as
φ(p) =
Q∑
q=1
∑
i
∑
r 6=q
NTq∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[H˜rq]
i,j
∣∣∣∣2 pjr, (34)
the power control game ends up with the NE that minimizes
total multiuser interference. It should be noted that the index i
counts the rows of M in (38). Hence, the elements of ∇pqφ(p)
–namely as ∇ipqφ(p)– can be shown as
∇ipqφ(p) =
∑
j
∑
r 6=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
H˜qr
]
j,i
σjr
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, i = 1, ..., NTq , (35)
where j counts the rows of matrix M shown in (38). Equa-
tion (34) can be used in the waterfilling operator (i.e.,(23))
accordingly.
2) Maximizing Sum-rate: Let the merit function for
i = 1, ..., NTq be expressed as
∇ipqφ(pq) =
∑
j
∑
r 6=q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
[
H˜qr
]
j,i
σjr
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
pjr
cjr( c
j
r + p
j
r )
, (36)
where j counts the row of of the matrix M shown in (38).
using (36) in (23), we end up with the same problem that
the previously proposed pricing algorithms were trying to
solve [15], [16], [17]. The difference in here is that we
determined the condition to implement the pricing algorithm
asynchronously, while the previous studies proposed Jacobi
and Gauss-Seidel methods without any proof of convergence
for asynchronous method. The merit function that the users try
to optimize is
φ(p) =
−∑
r 6=1
Rr,−
∑
r 6=2
Rr, ...,−
∑
r 6=Q
Rr
T . (37)
Therefore, the intuitive meaning of the pricing algorithms is
that while a user optimizes its power allocation, it tries to use
a power allocation that maximizes sum-rate of other users.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we verify our theoretical analyses done in
the previous section. We assumed the same setting as in section
VI for the MIMO channel plus the assumption that the MIMO
channel is frequency selective (with a channel order of L = 3),
so we set 16 subcarriers for each user. There are 10 users, each
with a 2x2 direct MIMO channel.
A. Exact vs. Inexact Convergence
Fig. 3 shows the sum-rate of the users versus the number
of iterations for exact and inexact approach in one channel
realization. The sequence of errors δn is set to δn = (0.95)n.
We used Jacobi method for inner loop of algorithms VII.1
and VII.2 whenever they are simulated. The minimization of
multiuser interference (with (n) = 11+10n ) is used as the
merit function. It is clear that using inexact convergence can
considerably reduce the number of iterations.
B. Improving the sum-rate of the users
Fig. 4 shows the sum-rate of the users versus the number
of iterations for 3 different algorithms in one channel real-
ization. The solid curve (labeled ”IWFA”) shows the simple
asynchronous algorithm described in algorithm V.1, the dotted
curve (labeled ”RJ”) shows the modified algorithm designed
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Fig. 6: Comparison of sum-rate of the proposed algorithms for
different values of path-loss
in section VII-A, and the dashed curve (labeled ”MIN MUI”)
shows a controlled convergence designed in section VII-B that
uses minimum multiuser interference as its merit function. It
can be seen that IWFA method oscillates between two points.
In such condition the interference is strong and the conditions
in theorem 1 are not satisfied, so there are multiple equilibria
in the power control game. The multiple equilibria appears
as oscillation in the convergence trend of IWFA algorithm.
It is clear that both modified algorithms converge eventually.
Furthermore, we see that (despite a few signaling between the
users) controlling convergence improves the performance more
than when we do not have a merit function. Thus, because of
the absence of a merit function in RJ algorithm, we may not
necessarily improve the performance of the network.
C. Comparison of Sum-rate
In Fig. 5, the sum-rate of the users (in bps/Hz) versus the
total transmit power is depicted. It is assumed that all the
transmitters have the same total transmit power. The path-loss
for each user is fixed at
(
dqq
drq
)γ
= 10dB, and P iq = 10dB (see
proposition 2). Each point on the curves is the mean value
of 1000 channel realizations. The curve labeled ”MAX SR”
shows the modified algorithm with maximization of the sum-
rate as the merit function, and the curve labeled ”TDMA”
shows the performance of the network when the interference
free approach –namely as ”Time Division Multiple Access”–
is used. We see that the MAX SR algorithm has a performance
loss for low transmit power and the highest performance
for larger transmit powers. The loss of performance occurs
because of the fact that the elements of ∇φ(p) are large for
low transmit powers which makes users’ power allocation
dominated by the merit function. In fact, users do not use
their transmit power efficiently in channels as the price they
pay is too much expensive. However, this trend vanishes and
the advantage of using MAX SR emerges as the total transmit
power of the users grow. MIN MUI algorithm performs better
than IWFA in all of the transmit powers. IWFA algorithm has a
better performance than the TDMA method, but its advantage
is lost as the transmit power grows, because the selfish act
of the users grows interference in the network. RJ algorithm
performs better than IWFA, but because of no control on its
convergence point, it cannot reach the performance of MAX
SR and MIN MUI.
Fig. 6 shows the sum-rate of the users versus the path-
loss (i.e.,
(
dqq
drq
)γ
), when the total transmit power is fixed
at Pq = 10dB. It can be seen that for low interference
powers (
(
dqq
drq
)γ
is small) MAX SR has some performance
degradation. Because in low interference power, the users are
almost orthogonal to each other, this interference management
technique is not very much superior to simpler techniques.
However, for higher interference powers, the performance of
MAX SR becomes more evident.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the concept of contractive functions was
employed to derive the convergence conditions of the dis-
tributed power control in multi-user MIMO networks. The
convergence conditions derived in this paper can be used in
practice by the designer to create a distributed power control
framework. Simulations show that the proposed criteria can
predict a unique NE more than the previous work. Further-
more, the proposed power control algorithm can be imple-
mented asynchronously, which gives a noticeable flexibility to
our algorithm depending on the practical limitations. Despite
these advantages, we modified our algorithm to improve the
sum-rate of the network. It was shown that by exchanging a
limited amount of signaling, improving the performance of our
algorithm is possible. Furthermore, we proposed the inexact
version of our modified algorithm to boost the convergence
speed. Although the inexact approach seems promising in
reducing convergence time, lowering the amount coordination
needed for the modified approaches must be taken into account
as an interesting subject of future research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Assuming p = [p1, p2, ..., pq, ..., pQ]T with pq =
[p1q, ..., p
NTq
q ]T = diag
(E {xqxHq }), we first prove that the
interference function I(p) = [I1(p), ..., IQ(p)]T is contractive,
where Iq(p) = [I1q (p), ..., I
νq
q (p)]T and Iiq(p) = c
i
q . Next, we
use the second item in proposition 1 to prove that the water-
filling operator is also a contractive function8.
8The water-filling operator can be achieved by a simple manipulation of
Iiq(p). Without the loss of generality of our approach, we negelected the
second term in the representation of ciq during the following analyses.
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(38)
The contractivity of the interference functions can be
shown if we are able to show the vector I(p) with a close-form
representation.The interference function I(p) can be shown as
I(p) = M.p, (39)
where M is a {(∑Qq=1 νq)} × {(∑Qq=1NTq )} matrix which
is shown in (38). Depending on the value of νq , we present
different proofs for contractivity.
1) νq = NTq = NRq : In this case, the matrix M is a
square matrix. While checking the contractivity properties of
I(p), we conclude that the first two properties (i.e. positivity
and monotonicity) are obvious. For the third property (i.e.
contractivity property), assuming a positive vector v, we have
I(p+ v) = M.p+M.v ≤ I(p) + ||M ||v∞v, (40)
where ||.||v∞ is the weighted maximum norm given the vector
v > 0. Therefore, if ||M ||v∞ < 1, the function I(p) is
a contractive function, and according to the properties of
contractive functions, the iterative water-filling between the
users will converge to a unique fixed point that is the Nash
equilibrium of the power control game. It is known that for the
non-negative square matrices (e.g. M ), there exists a positive
vector v such that ||M ||v∞ < 1 if and only if ρ(M) < 1,
where ρ(.) is the spectral radius of a matrix [11]. Both of these
measures are difficult to evaluate in the practical cases because
the designer has to have access to the matrix M to predict
the uniqueness of NE. The easiest verifiable conditions can be
derived by choosing v = 1, which yields the inequality in (13),
or equivalently ||M ||∞ < 1. Since ρ(M) = ρ(MT ), all of the
aforementioned derivations about a non-negative square matrix
can be done for its transposed version (i.e. MT ). Doing so for
MT yields the inequality in (14). The physical interpretation of
(13) and (14) suggests that the sum of normalized interference
produced by each user has to be less than one, or alternatively
the sum of received normalized interference at each receiver
should be less than one. This intuitive interpretation can be
easily used by the designer to determine a minimum distance
that ensures the uniqueness of NE with high probability.
2) νq = NTq < NRq : As (38) suggests, in this case, the
matrix M is still a square matrix and all of the aforementioned
proof about the previous case is also true about this case.
3) νq = NTq > NRq : In this case, the matrix M is not
square and the proofs of the previous cases cannot be employed
for this case. As we want to have a set of unified conditions for
all the cases, a simple manipulation of the matrix M can make
it a square matrix for this case. This manipulation is done by
adding several rows of zeroes to the matrix M for the user –
say qth user– that has NTq > NRq . Adding zero rows is done
until sum of the qth user’s transmit antennas equals to the sum
of both its receive antennas and the zero rows added for the
qth user. We should note that by adding rows of zeroes for
each user (whose transmit antennas are more than its receive
antennas), the whole measurements for the interference will
not be affected. In fact, we assume that adding zero rows to
M is equal to adding a receive antenna that does not receive
neither signal nor interference (i.e. it is turned off). Hence, the
matrix M is eventually square again and we can use the same
proofs we used previously.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First of all, we explain the reason behind making the
assumptions in this theorem. The first assumption is made
so that the optimization problem in (27) will be a convex
optimization. The second assumption puts an upper limit on the
variations of φ(p) so that we can calculate the constant τ and
make the third assumption to ensure the uniqueness of NE9. It
may seem that the Lipschitz modulus cannot be calculated in
practical situations. Because of this reason, the constant (n)
is chosen as a terminating sequence. Hence, as the iterations
grow up, the term (n)∇ipqφ(p) vanishes. However, this term
should not be terminated too much fast because otherwise, the
effect of this term (minimizing φ(p)) would not be significant.
Therefore, we make the assumption
∑∞
n=1 
(n) =∞ to have a
slowly terminating sequence. Examples of such sequence are:
• (n) = (n−1) (1− E(n−1)) , E ∈ (0, 1).
• (n) = 11+αn , α > 0.
We let the solution set of (27) as S ⊂ SOL(Q, F ). While
in the nth iteration, let us introduce the mapping GS(p(n−1))
as the euclidean projection of the vector p(n−1) on the set
S. As GS(p(n−1)) ∈ S ⊂ SOL(Q, F ), by considering
V I(Q, F )in the nth iteration we have:
F (GS(p(n−1)))T (p(n) −GS(p(n−1))) ≥ 0. (41)
We know that F (p) is monotone, so:
F (p(n))T (GS(p(n−1))− p(n)) ≤ 0. (42)
Replacing p(n) in V I(Q, F,τ ) we have:[
F (p(n)) + (n)∇φ(p(n))
]T
(y − p(n)) ≥
τ(p(n−1) − p(n))(y − p(n)). (43)
If the third assumption holds, limn→∞ ||p(n) − p(n−1)|| = 0.
Hence, [
F (p(n)) + (n)∇φ(p(n))
]T
(y − p(n)) ≥ 0. (44)
setting y = GS(p) and considering (42):
0 ≥ F (p(n))T (GS(p(n−1))− p(n)) ≥
(n)∇φ(p(n))T (p(n) −GS(p(n−1))),
⇒ ∇φ(p(n))T (GS(p(n−1))− p(n)) ≥ 0. (45)
Therefore, as n → ∞, the inequality in (45) shows the
minimum principle for the convex function φ(p), indicating
the point p(n) results in the minimum of φ(p).
9One can check that all of the merit functions chosen in this paper satisfy
Lipschitz continuity.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In order to prove this property, we first introduce the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. In the nth iteration of algorithm VII.1, for p(n) ∈
SOL(Q, F ) (i.e., exact solution of inner loop) and p(n)δ ∈
SOLδn(Q, Fτ ) (i.e., inexact solution of inner loop) we have:
||p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ||2 + ||p(n)δ − p(n)||2 ≤ ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)||2 + 2
δn
τ
(46)
and consequently:
||p(n)δ − p(n)||2 ≤ ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)||2 + 2
δn
τ
. (47)
Proof:
Since p(n) ∈ SOL(Q, F ), setting y = p(n)δ in V I(Q, F )
yields:
F (p(n))T (p
(n)
δ − p(n)) ≥ 0. (48)
F (p) is monotone, so:
F (p
(n)
δ )
T (p(n) − p(n)δ ) ≤ 0. (49)
On the other hand p(n)δ ∈ SOLδn(Q, Fτ ), so according to
(31), by setting y = p(n) we have:
Fτ (p
(n)
δ )
T (p(n) − p(n)δ ) ≥ −δn. (50)
Thus, we can be certain that at least:
1
2
dTn .en = (p
(n)
δ − p(n−1)δ )T (p(n) − p(n)δ ) ≥ −
δn
τ
, (51)
Where dn = p
(n)
δ − p(n−1)δ and en = p(n) − p(n)δ . Using (51),
we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣p(n−1)δ − p(n)∣∣∣∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣∣∣(p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ )− (p(n) − p(n)δ )∣∣∣∣∣∣2 =∣∣∣∣∣∣p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣p(n) − p(n)δ ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + 4dTnen ≥∣∣∣∣∣∣p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣∣∣∣p(n) − p(n)δ ∣∣∣∣∣∣2 − 2δnτ
(52)
Comparing the most left hand side of the above inequality with
the right hand side, we reach the inequality (46).
Furthermore, rearranging the inequality (46) we have:
||p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ||2 + ||p(n)δ − p(n)||2 − ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)||2 ≤
2
δn
τ
.
(53)
As ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ||2 is a positive value, we can deduce
assuredly that
||p(n)δ − p(n)||2 − ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)||2 ≤ 2
δn
τ
, (54)
which yields inequality (47).
In the following, we introduce another lemma:
Lemma 2. [18, Lemma 2.2] Let an, bn, and cn be real and
positive sequences, such that
∑∞
n=0 cn < ∞ and an+1 ≤
an − bn + cn. Then an converges and
∑∞
n=0 bn <∞.
Using lemma 2 in the inequality (53) (i.e., setting an =
||p(n−1)δ − p(n)|| (so an+1 = ||p(n)δ − p(n)|| ), cn = δnτ , and
bn = ||p(n−1)δ − p(n)δ ||2 we have:
lim
n→∞ ||p
(n)
δ − p(n)||2 <∞. (55)
Using the result of (55) in (46) and considering the assump-
tions made on δnτ , we can conclude that
lim
n→∞ ||p
(n)
δ − p(n−1)δ || = 0. (56)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
This theorem states that with a lower number of iterations
for the inner loop of algorithm VII-C, we can still reach to the
minimum point of our merit function (i.e., φ(p)).
In order to prove this theorem, we use the same reasoning
as we presented in the proof of theorem 4. We let the solution
set of (27) as S ⊂ SOL(Q, F ). While in the nth iteration,
let us introduce the mapping GS(p
(n−1)
δ ) as the euclidean
projection of the vector p(n−1)δ on the set S. Going under
the same procedure as in theorem 4, the following equations
yield:
F (GS(p
(n−1)
δ ))
T (p
(n)
δ −GS(p(n−1)δ )) ≥ 0,
(57)
F (p
(n)
δ )
T (GS(p
(n−1)
δ )− p(n)δ ) ≤ 0.
Replacing p(n)δ in V I(Q, F,τ ) we have:[
F (p
(n)
δ ) + 
(n)∇φ(p(n)δ )
]T
(y − p(n)δ ) ≥
τ(p
(n−1)
δ − p(n)δ )(y − p(n)δ )− δn. (58)
The result of proposition 3 suggests that limn→∞ ||p(n)δ −
p
(n−1)
δ || = 0. Hence,[
F (p
(n)
δ ) + 
(n)∇φ(p(n)δ )
]T
(y − p(n)δ ) ≥ −δn. (59)
setting y = GS(p
(n−1)
δ ) and considering (57):
δn ≥ F (p(n)δ )T (GS(p(n−1)δ )− p(n)δ ) + δn ≥
(60)
(n)∇φ(p(n)δ )T (p(n)δ −GS(p(n−1)δ )),
We have assumed that limn→∞ δnτ = 0, so
∇φ(p(n)δ )T (GS(p(n−1)δ )− p(n)δ ) ≥ 0. (61)
Therefore, as n→∞, for all p ∈ SOLδn(Q, F ), the inequality
in (60) shows the minimum principle for the convex function
φ(p), indicating that the point p(n)δ is the minimum point for
φ(p).
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